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Home Equity Lending: Boon or Bane?
Home equity loans are an increasingly important
source of credit for households and a growing
componenf of bank portfolios. Cornmercial
banks are by far the largest providers of home
equity credit, with about 40 percent of all out-
standing home equity loans. Between 1987 and
1988, banks' home equity loans grew by over 30
percent, from $28.9 billion to $37.5 billion. As a
share of total bank assets, home equity loans
grew from about one percent to over 1.3 percent.
Thrifts, finance companies, and brokerage firms
also engage in home equity lending.
Home equity lending is widely considered a
low-risk lending activity. Like first mortgage
loans, these loans are secured by housing assets,
the value of which has performed well histor-
ically. Nonetheless, the rapid growth of home
equity lending warrants a review of the rationale
for and performance of the home equity loan
market.
As discussed in this Letter, the home equity loan
market appears to be developing conservatively.
The nature of the instrument, however, makes
home equity loans somewhat riskier than they
may appear at first glance.
been replenished by repayment of outstanding
balances.
The available data suggest that the main uses of
home equity credit are to consolidate other debt
(about 50 percent), finance home improvements
(25 percent), and finance automobile purchases
(10 percent). Financing medical expenditures and
other consumer purchases account for the
balance.
Home equity, taxes, and regulation
Apart from the traditional "closed-end" second
mortgages that banks and thrifts have always
offered, home equity lending is a relatively new
line of business for financial institutions. In 1980,
fewer than one percent of banking institutions
offered home equity lines of credit. Today, 80
percent of commercial banks and 65 percent
of thrifts offer such products.
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Economic and regulatory developments are
responsible for the recent growth of home equity
lending by banks and for the growing interest on
the part of consumers. Economic forces, in par-
ticular, have been important. During the late
1970s and early 1980s, home prices rose sharply,
improving the housing equity positions of many
Home equity lending
A home equity loan can be structured in one
of two ways. First, it can be structured as a
traditional second mortgage, wherein the bor-
rower obtains funds equal to the full loan amount
immediately, and commits to a fixed repayment
schedule. Alternatively, home equity borrowing
can be structured as a line of credit, with check,
credit card, or other easy access to the line over
its life.
The home equity credit line presently is the
dominant form of new home equity lending. The
home equity credit line, like other "open-end"
or revolving credit facilities, permits the borrower
to draw advances against the line whenever
needed (up to the limit of the facility). The
amount of credit available at a given time
depends upon the extent to which the line hasFRBSF
households. To the extent households have
viewed this appreciation as permanent, they
probably have come to consider this equity part
of their stock of savings. It is natural, therefore,
that the market would seek a means of mobiliz-.
ing this wealth by providing a home equity credit
facility. Indeed, as the chart indicates, home
equity lending is most active in states were the
level of home values is high.
Moreover, changes in the laws and regulations
governing home equity lending facilitated the
development of products that could take advan-
tage of this stock of wealth. First, in 1982, the
Truth in Lending Act was modified to remove a
major impediment to home equity lending.
Originally, the Act, as implemented by Federal
Reserve Regulation Z, gave consumers three days
to change their minds following each, separate
drawdown on a line of credit secured by real
estate. This stringent "right of rescission" repre-
sented a significant cost disadvantage of home
equity credit facilities relative to credit card and
otherrevolvingdebt lines. The 1982 law limited
the right of rescission to the initial setup of the
loan, thereby making home equity lines of credit
more attractive to lenders.
Second, the 1982 Banking Act expanded the
authority of national banks to extend flexible,
home equity credit, enabling them to make real
estate loans primarily on the basis ofthe credit-
worthiness and income prospects of the bor-
rower. For federally-chartered thrifts, the Act
lifted the restriction that they lend only on the
security of "first lien" collateral. Both of these
changes facilitated the crafting of home equity
credit lines.
The 1986 and 1987 Tax Acts also have influenced
the market for home equity lending. The 1986
Act phases out the deductibility of interest pay-
ments on most forms of consumer loans, making
consumer debt generally more costly to house-
holds. The only exception is interest on loans
secured by a taxpayer's principal or second
residence, which remains deductible, although
there are restrictions on the maximum principal
amount of a home equity loan that qualifies for
an interest deduction. The 1987 tax revisions
limit the amount to the lesser of true home equity
(that is, the fair markef valueminus acquisition
debt) or $100,000. These reforms make real es-
tate lines of credit relatively less expensive than
other forms of consumer credit, and undoubtedly
contribute to the strength of the home equity
loan market.
Pricing home equity loans
Traditional second mortgages typically are
structured like first mortgages, usually with fixed
interest rates and a fully-amortizing repayment
schedule. Home equity lines of credit, on the
other hand, are typically adjustable-rate
instruments.
The adjustable-rate feature likely is a conse-
quence of the contingent nature of a line of
credit. In essence, a line of credit embodies a
series of "options" to obtain credit over the life
of the line. If a fixed-rate contract were used, and
interest rates rose above the contract rate, bor-
rowers would exercise the option to borrow and
profitably invest the funds in the open market at
higher rates. From the standpoint of the lender,
offering a fixed-rate home equity credit line,
thus, is equivalent to selling long-term interest-
rate "call" options.
Financial markets in general appear reluctant to
offer such long-term options, perhaps because
the market doubts the ability of the writer of
such options (that is, the lender in the case of
fixed-rate home equity lines) to perform on his
obligations in an adverse economic environment.
Thus, the pricing of home equity lines of credit as
adjustable-rate instruments is consistent with the
general rarity of pure, long-term interest rate
options in the economy. Regulators also dis-
courage lenders from writing pure options.
As with other adjustable-rate instruments, the
contract rate is linked to a reference rate (often
the prime rate plus about two percentage points).
Home equity line rates, however, seldom have
restrictive caps, implying that households (rather
than banks) are bearing the entirety of interest
rate risk. It can be argued that functional caps
are likely to become more common as competi-
tion in home equity lending grows, since house-
holds are less able than banks to accommodate
interest rate risk. Hence, as in the first lien
adjustable-rate mortgage market, it is likely that
capped-rate instruments ultimately will dominate
pure, adjustable-rate ones in the home equity
loan market.Risk in home equity loans
One future source of risk in home equity loans,
therefore, will be the interest rate risk introduced
by the move towards capped-rate products.
There are, however, other sources as well. A
major source of risk to loans collateralized by
housing, of course, is the possibility that local
housing values or household purchasing power
may decline, stimulating abandonment of the
property and default on debt secured by the
housing. Certain features of home equity loans
make them particularly susceptible to such risks.
First, while the adjustable-rate feature of the debt
reduces the interest rate risk of the lender, the
variable payment size exposes households to
greater cash-flow risks than would a fixed-rate
instrument, everything else being equal. This, in
turn, exposes the lender to greater credit risk.
Ironically, another source of risk is the very
fact that such lines employ collateral. Theory
suggests that collateral reduces risk, since a
general claim on a borrower is augmented by a
specific claim on an asset. However, processes of
"self-selection" can reverse this relationship.
Namely, it is possible that borrowers who choose
to pledge collateral are riskier than those who
can obtain unsecured credit.
In addition to the risks inherent in self selection,
there are risks introduced by the very nature of
the home equity loan. They are secured by a lien
that generally is junior to that of any primary
mortgage debt. Thus, home equity lines of credit
of a given size have less effective equity protec-
tion than first lien instruments; a decline in the
value of the underlying housing results in a much
greater than proportional decline in the collateral
coverage of a home equity loan. This added
leverage makes them correspondingly far riskier
than first mortgages. Moreover, the law governing
the quality or "perfection" of the lien is quite
complicated, and the lien of future advances
may be different from that of the initial advance
since in the meantime, other events or liens may
be interposed. While lenders' counsel try to craft
loan agreements that avoid legal pitfalls, the
effective riskiness of home equity lending likely
varies somewhat with the legal environment.
(There are, for example, at least 27 variations in
the treatment of lien priority across states.)
This variation in contract characteristics also
affects the liquidity of home equity debt. For debt
to be easily pooled and sold in the secondary
market, it needs to be fairly consistent in its
credit- and interest rate-risk characteristics. The
complexity of collateral structures, coupled with
the inherently uncertain maturity of revolving
credit instruments, makes home equity loan
assets considerably less liquid than straight,
first lien, fixed maturity debt.
Handle with care
Outstanding home equity credit, while growing
rapidly, presently represents far less than 10
percent of the outstanding value of home equity,
currently estimated at $3 trillion. The continued
high level of home values, coupled with favor-
able tax treatment, likely will spur further growth
in this segment of the credit market, making it a
significant component of bank and thrift port-
folios.
However, adverse-selection processes, legal
complexities, and other features of these loans
can be importantsources of risk. In fact, there
is some evidence that delinquency rates are
higher for home equity lines than for unsecured
lines. In addition, mortgage insurers tend to
experience greater difficulties with adjustable-
rate instruments than with fixed-rate, first lien
mortgage debt. Comprehensive data on compar-
ative rates of nonperformance and charge-offs
are not presently available. It is clear, however,
that continuing assessment of the risks in home
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